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ARGUMENT 
Each of the Appellees who filed a Brief have asserted that summary judgment or 
dismissal was appropriate in this case. See: Workers Compensation Fund's (WCF) Brief at 
1, 16, 18, 19, 27-28; TAD Technical Services Corporation's (TAD) Brief at 16, 22; ACE 
USA/Pacific Employers Ins. Co.'s (PACIFIC) Brief at 4,9-11. As Giles argued in her Brief 
the Appellees' and the Commission's failure to follow proper procedure should have 
precluded the Commission from reaching any Motion for Summary Judgment or Motion to 
Dismiss. Giles' Brief at 26-35, 39-43, 44-49, 49a. The Appellees have neither disputed 
Giles' arguments, nor presented any justification for the Commission to grant dismissals or 
summary judgment without following proper procedure. 
Giles raised four separate issues in her Brief, argued multiple points, and presented 
multiple facts, most of which were unassailed by the Appellees' in their Briefs. The 
Supreme Court has stated: 
"The brief of the appellee must contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellee with respect to the issues presented in the opposing (appellant's) brief." 
Brown v. Glover. 16 P.3d 540, 545 (Utah 2000). (Emphasis added). 
The arguments the Appellees failed to dispute are listed below under each issue, with citation 
to the points in Giles' Brief and the Record where those arguments were raised below. 
(1) The Issue of the Commission's disregard for the critical issue of jurisdiction. 
(a) Giles' arguments that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to make new 
findings relative to the prior claim in the present claim. Giles' Brief at 1-2, 26-35, 
R. Vol. 4 at 1106. 
(b) Giles' arguments that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue the Order 
Denying Reconsideration dated 16 July 2003. Giles' Brief at 2, 35-36, see also 8. 
(2) The issue that by statutory definition Giles' occupational disease claim could not be 
included in the injury by accident claim, and 
(a) Giles' arguments relative thereto. Giles' Brief at 1-2, 3-4, 26-35, 36-37, 
1 
R. Vol. 2 at 479-480,483, Vol. 3 at 614,706,779-780,798-799, Vol. 4 at 933,1010, 
1104-1106. 
(3) The issue that Oakridge Country Club (Oakridge), WCF, Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins., 
and Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF) are contractually prohibited from asserting 
Giles settled her occupational disease claim when she executed the Settlement 
Agreement dated 8 March 1995, based on a subsequent Settlement Agreement and 
Release (SA/Release) executed by Giles and her employer, Oakridge. 
(a) Giles' arguments that the defenses asserted by Oakridge and WCF 
represent a material breach of the SA/Release dated 18 August 1997. Giles' Brief at 
2, 37-38; see also Pages 20-22. 
(b) Giles' arguments mat the Commission's practice in other cases is 
irrelevant, and is superceded by the Commission's previous practice in the present 
case. Giles' Brief at 2, 38-39, see also 25, R. Vol. 2 at 373. 
(c) Giles' arguments concerning the loss of documents by the Commission. 
Giles' Brief at 38-39; see also 6, 7, 17,20. 
(4) The issue of the Commission repeatedly showing favor to employers and their 
insurance carriers, indicating bias and prejudice toward applicants, and that the 
Commission has financial and other conflicts of interest. 
(a) Giles' arguments that the Commission applied the wrong standard to 
Requests for Dismissals. Giles' Brief at 2, 39-42. 
(b) Giles' arguments that Summary Judgment should not be rendered prior to 
the completion of discovery, which Giles was not permitted by Commission Rule to 
conduct. Giles' Brief at 42-43, R. Vol. 4 at 1039-1040,1096-1097,1152,1155-1156, 
1157-1159, 1162. 
(c) Giles' arguments that the Commission's applicable Rule regarding 
discovery was not only biased and prejudicial on its face, but did not provide for 
injured workers to conduct discovery, depriving Giles of her constitutional right to 
conduct discovery in this case. Giles' Brief at 42-43, R. Vol. 4 at 1039-1040,1096-
1097, 1152, 1155-1156,1157-1159, 1162. 
(d) Giles' arguments that the Commission and the PALJ failed to refer this 
occupational disease claim to a medical panel as required by applicable statutes in all 
occupational disease cases. Giles' Brief at 44, R. Vol. 3 at 763-771, 774-776, 784-
786, 898-900, 918, Vol. 4 at 1042, 1098-1101, 1160-1161, 1163, 1206. 
(e) Giles' arguments that the Commission applied the wrong standard on 
review of the issue of an independent ALJ. Giles' Brief at 45, and Page 9 of Giles' 
Petition for Rehearing filed with this Court on 20 December 2001, attached hereto as 
Exhibit 'A' in the Addendum.1 
The Petition for Rehearing was filed with this Court and the issues raised therein were 
specifically incorporated into this appeal, without objection, by Giles on Page 9 of the 
Docketing Statement. When Giles' moved to supplement the Record, the only objection was 
filed by TAD, who explicitly waived any objection to inclusion of the Petition for Rehearing. 
(f) Giles5 arguments that the Commission's decision regarding WCF was 
contrary to WCF's own Answer, its own defenses in this case, and the Commission's 
findings in the prior injury case. Giles' Brief at 45-47, see also 13-16, 34. 
(g) Giles' arguments that the Commission failed in the present disease case and 
the prior injury case to consider any exposures on any other days than 7 September 
1991, the day of the incident in the prior injury case. Giles' Brief at 45-47, see also 
13-16, 18, 34-35. 
(h) Giles' arguments that this Court, and the Commission by its actions, had 
ruled that the present disease claim and the prior injury claim are not the same claim. 
Giles' Brief at 47, see also 32. 
(i) Giles' arguments that the Commission failed to enforce its own Rules and 
filing deadlines against Appellees. Giles' Brief at 6,47-48, R. cites are too numerous 
to list. 
(k) Giles' arguments that the Commission allowed new defenses by employers 
and insurers after they had filed their Answers in violation of the Commission's Rule 
governing answers, and the Commission basing its Orders on those new defenses. 
Giles' Brief at 47-48. 
Despite WCF's statements to the contrary, Giles addressed financial conflicts of 
interest between the Commission and WCF, and also between the Commission and ERF. 
R. Vol. 1 at 220-221,226-230, Vol. 2 at 333-334,507-508,533-535,576-577,596-597, Vol. 
3 at 610-612, 653, 753-754, 778, 788, Vol. 4 at 1042, 1098-1101,1160-1161, 1163, 1206. 
Additionally, Giles presented the following facts in her Brief which were not disputed 
by Appellees in their Briefs. These facts are followed by citations to Giles' Brief and the 
Record where Giles raised these facts below. 
(1) The fact that Giles filed her Notice of Claim for her occupational disease with die 
Commission on 19 May 1995. Giles' Brief at 4, 16-17, R. Vol. 1 at 56-59, 96, 98, 
166, 168, 173, 199, 210, 245-254, Vol. 2 at 376-380, 383, 398-399, 400, 401, 520, 
Vol. 3 at 737, 740-741, 743, 747, 762, 764-765, 772, 885, 901-903, Vol. 4 at 997-
998, 1000, 1043, 1055-1058, 1060-1061, 1098, 1152, 1168-1169. 
(2) The fact that Giles mailed a copy of her claim of an occupational disease to her 
former employers, including TAD and WCF by U.S. Postal Service certified mail 
with return receipt requested, which were received by each no later than 31 May 1995 
as shown by the return receipts. Giles' Brief at 4-5,16-17, R. Vol. 1 at 56-59,96,98, 
166, 168, 173, 199, 210, 245-254, Vol. 2 at 376-380, 383, 398-399, 400, 401, 520, 
Vol. 3 at 737, 740-741, 743, 747, 762, 764-765, 772, 885, 901-903, Vol 4 at 997-
3 
998,1000,1043,1055-1058,1060-1061,1098,1152,1168-1169. 
(3) The fact that Oakridge filed an Employer's First Report of Illness (Form 122) on 13 
September 1995. Giles' Brief at 5, 19-20, 39, R. Vol. 3 at 741, 804-805, Vol. 4 at 
958. 
(4) The fact that TAD failed to file an Employer's First Report of Illness (Form 122). 
Giles' Brief at 17, R. Vol. 3 at 740-741, 885-902. 
(5) The fact that TAD failed to provide Giles with the statutorily required statement of 
her rights and responsibilities relative to her occupational disease claim. Giles' Brief 
at 17, 20, R. Vol. 3 at 740-741, 885-902; 
(6) The fact that none of the Appellees timely (within 21 days) accepted and began 
payment of benefits, or timely (within 21 days) denied Giles' occupational disease 
claim as required by Commission Rule R568-1-14. Giles' Brief at 17, R. Vol. 1 at 
126,137, 166,173-174,207-210, Vol. 3 at 741-744,750-751,797-798,885, Vol. 4 
at 1000,1047, 1111. 
(7) The fact that most of the Appellees failed to file a Notice to Submit for Decision on 
their Motion for Summary Judgment or Motions to Dismiss, and the issue of whether 
that failure was a violation of an applicable Rule. Giles' Brief at 44-45, R. Vol. 4 at 
1156-1157, 1162, 1225. 
(8) The fact that Forms 089 filed by Giles' employers and their insurance carriers did not 
meet the Commission's requirements for an 'Answer', yet the Commission accepted 
them as 'Answers'. Giles' Brief at 6, R. Vol. 2 at 437-439,440-442, 443-445, Vol. 
3 at 673-678,750-751, 760, 784, Vol. 4 at 994-1007,1221. 
(9) The fact that Giles' filed requests for Entries of Default and Motions for Orders 
Striking the Defenses and Answers of Giles' employers and their insurance carriers, 
but the Commission did not rule on them. Giles' Brief at 7, 49a, R. Vol. 1 at 165-
182, 184-185, Vol. 2 at 398-406, 477-489, Vol. 3 at 673-676, 679-683. 
(10) Giles'general assertions of fraud, misrepresentation, and perjury. Giles'Brief at 49, 
R. Vol. 1 at 166-167, 174,207,220-221,226-229, Vol. 2 at 334-335, Vol. 3 at 758, 
778-780, Vol. 4 at 941-943, 1010, 1011-1014,1044-1045, 1049, 1051, 1081-1086, 
1088-1091, 1101-1102, 1104-1107, 1111, 1201-1203. 
Accordingly, these facts should be accepted as true by this Court. The mere fact that 
the Commission failed to refer this case to a medical panel, which fact was undisputed in 
Appellees' Briefs, should have precluded summary judgment. U.C.A. § 35-1-77 (l)(b) and 
(c) (1991), the applicable statute in the present case, required: 
"(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to an 
occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission shall except upon 
stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel. 
"(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing in the 
treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim." 
As support for this position, Giles refers this Court to a similar case, Johnson v. 
Moore Business Forms. 694 P.2d 597 (Utah 1984). In that case, Johnson brought a claim 
under the occupational disease disability law. The ALJ dismissed the claim after a hearing. 
and the Industrial Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 
holding that the ALJ was required to call a medical panel upon claimant's assertion of an 
occupational disease to decide the extent and causation of any disabihty. The following 
quotes, in pertinent part, from Johnson apply to die present case: 
"The issue in this review from the Industrial Commission is whether an 
administrative law judge can dispose of a claim . . . under the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disabihty Law without calling a medical panel." Johnson, at 597. 
"The Act requires that when such a claim is filed with the Commission, 
'the commission shall appoint an impartial medical panel.. .V (Italics emphasis 
Court's) Johnson, at 598. (Bold and underlined emphasis added). 
"Despite the clear requirement of the statute that upon the mere filing of such 
a claim a medical panel 'shall' be convened, the administrative law judge took it 
upon himself to hold a hearing, consider the evidence, including the supportive 
medical opinion of Mrs. Johnson's doctor, and make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law that Mrs. Johnson's (alleged occupational disease) did not result from any of 
the causes enumerated in (the applicable statute). He then dismissed her claim." 
Johnson, at 598. (Emphasis added). 
"Because that finding was made without first convening a medical panel as 
required by section 35-2-56(2) (in the present case the aforementioned § 35-l-77(b) 
(1991)) of the Act, we reverse." Johnson, at 598. (Parenthetical comment added). 
"The administrative law judge seemed to be operating under the unspoken 
premise that not every claim filed that alleges the statutory elements requires 
convening a medical panel; only those cases that pass some threshold test of 
meritoriousness established by the administrative law judge may go forward. That 
interpretation of the statute is contrary to the plain language of section § 35-2-56(2) 
and, furthermore, is flatly contrary to this Court's holdings in Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 695-96 (1980), and Lipman v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (1979). In those cases, we ruled that similar 
language in the Workers' Compensation Act required the convening of a medical 
panel in all cases. Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 35-1-77 (1974 ed.). 
"In the present case, Mrs. Johnson's claim met the required statutory minimum 
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to trigger the convening of a medical panel . . . (Mrs. Johnson)... produced a letter 
from her doctor.., opining that the requirements of her job played a causative role 
in her (physical) problems. Once she made this showing, a medical panel had to be 
called to report on whether the . . . requirements of her) job . . . resulted in her 
(claimed occupational disease). 
"The administrative law judge invaded the province of the medical panel when, 
without input from a panel, he found (no medical causation) ." Johnson, at 599. 
The Court then refers to a Footnote which states: 
"In his findings, the administrative law judge also stressed die fact that nothing 
unusual or accidental in nature had occurred on the day Mrs. Johnson first reported 
pain. That fact is irrelevant It is only when the injury complained of does not fit 
under die Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law and is dealt with under the 
Workers' Compensation Act that the claimant must show an identifiable accident 
as a prerequisite to recovery. See Pintarv. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276, 
277, 382 P.2d 414 (1963)." Johnson, at Footnote 2,599. (Emphasis added). 
In contrast to the Johnson case, there has not even been a hearing in the present claim, 
and yet the PALJ has taken it upon himself to decide that Giles has not shown medical 
causation regarding her exposures at TAD. Giles has presented evidence of the materials and 
substances she was exposed to on a daily basis, though not of any specific identifiable 
accidents. However, under Johnson. Giles does not have to show on what dates the 
exposures occurred, the quantity of fumes, the source of each fume, or die identity of all the 
toxic materials and substances to which she was exposed. Such is only required in an injury 
by accident claim. Giles has provided the Commission with a letter from Dr. Baker stating 
that he could find no non-industrial source for Giles' occupational disease, and none of the 
parties have presented any evidence to contradict his statement. R. Vol. 1 at 110-112,248-
250, Vol. 2 at 367-369. Giles was first exposed at TAD to many of the same materials and 
substances she was exposed to at Oakridge. And, Giles' has also provided medical evidence 
in a letter from Dr. Gunnar Heuser which verifies a causal connection between her porphyria 
and her employment at TAD. R. Vol. 4 at 1042-1043,1060-1063. Since the Commission 
failed to refer this claim to a medical panel, as required by statute and the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Johnson, the submission of this report on Reconsideration cannot be considered 
improper, nor can Giles' submission of an affidavit verifying what Giles had sworn in her 
Answers to Interrogatories a witness would testify to concerning Giles' exposures at TAD. 
Giles' position on mandatory referral to a medical panel is further supported by a case 
cited by TAD. In Allen v. Industrial Com'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1985), the Supreme 
Court stated, quoting from Schmidt: 
"'With the issue being one primarily of causation, the importance of the . . . 
medical panel becomes manifest. It is through die expertise of the medical panel that 
the Commission should be able to make the determination of whether the injury (or 
disease) sustained by a claimant is causally connected or contributed to by the 
claimant's employment' Schmidt, 617? 2d at 69T\ 
Moreover, in Willardson v. Industrial Com'n of Utak 904 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1995), the 
Supreme Court stated that it was improper to allow an "ALT, who has no medical training 
and possesses no medical degrees, to determine medical causation as a threshold question 
and dismiss (medical evidence) . . .'\ The Supreme Court went on to say that: 
"We have heretofore recognized, independent of any rule of the Commission, 
that 'where the evidence of a causal connection between the work-related event and 
the injury (or disease) is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the case to a 
medical panel may be an abuse of discretion.' Champion Home Builders v. Industrial 
Comm % 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985); accord Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 
1008, 1012 (Utah 1996). We find an abuse of discretion here." (Emphasis added). 
This determination was made in a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act where the 
Commission had discretion to appoint a medical panel. Clearly, when the Commission has 
no discretion regarding the appointment of a medical panel, failure to appoint a medical 
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panel is more than an abuse of discretion. It is a violation of applicable laws and reflects the 
Commission's partiality, unfairness, bias, prejudice and conflicts of interest. 
For this reason alone the Commission's Orders in this case should be reversed. In 
their Briefs, none of the Appellees addressed Giles' arguments concerning mandatory referral 
to a medical panel. Accordingly, Appellees' arguments in their Briefs that Summary 
Judgment was appropriately granted by the Commission are irrelevant and in error. Giles 
therefore requests this Court to reverse the Orders of the Commission for the following 
failings: failing to follow proper procedure; failing to abide by the Commission's own rules; 
and, failing to re-establish jurisdiction prior to making new findings concerning the prior 
claim. However, should this Court disagree with Giles on these issues, Giles responds to 
Appellees' Briefs as follows. 
Reply to Appellees' Course of the Proceedings and Statements of Fact 
This case was summarily dismissed by the Commission. Therefore, this Court 
presumes "to the extent necessary to resolve the issues on appeal, that the facts are as stated 
by (Giles)." Footnote 2 in Wrolstad v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 786 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 
App. 1990). See also: Avis v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n. 837 P.2d 584,585 (Utah 
App. 1992), and Velarde v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 123, 124 n. 2 (Utah App. 1992). 
Accordingly, Appellees must first show that Giles' facts are not accurate before this Court 
should disregard Giles' facts, and accept the facts of the Appellees. Giles' Brief at 4-25. 
Additionally, included in Appellees' Course of the Proceedings and Statement of the 
Case are "findings" by the Commission that Giles challenged in her Brief on jurisdictional 
grounds. Giles' Brief at 31-32, 33-34; TAD's Brief at 11, 12; WCF's Brief at 11, 12, 13. 
None of the Appellees disputed Giles' jurisdictional challenges. Accordingly, this Court 
should disregard Appellees' purported facts based on the Commission's "findings ". 
Likewise, none of the Appellees disputed Giles' jurisdictional challenges to the 
Commission's Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. Giles' Brief at 26-27, 35-36. 
This Court should disregard any reference made by Appellees to said Order or its contents. 
1) Reply to WCPs Issues and Determinative Law 
Issue A of Oakridge's and/or WCF's (hereinafter collectively WCF) Brief does not 
accurately reflect the Commission's actions. The Commission did not determine that Utah 
Code Annotated (U.C.A.) § 35-2-110 (1991 version, Supp. 1993) applied to this case. The 
PALJ applied § 35-2-110 (1991), but the Commission overruled the PALJ in its Order 
Denying Motion for Review and applied U.C.A. § 34A-3-111, which was enacted in 1997 
and has not been amended since. R. Vol. 3 at 731, Vol 4 at 1034. Even though the 
Commission did not have jurisdiction, the Commission again apphed § 34A-3-111 (1997) 
when it issued its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. R. Vol. 4 at 1233. 
WCF admits Giles' disease claim against WCF and the ERF was summarily 
dismissed. Yet, WCF asks this Court to decide whether "summary judgment" was 
appropriate without addressing Giles' issues and arguments concerning the different 
standards for summary judgment and dismissals. Giles' Brief at Pages 41-42. WCF has not 
given this Court any reason to apply the summary judgment standard in tight of Giles' 
arguments. So, this Court should apply the standard for dismissals to the Commission's 
grant of summary dismissal to WCF. The standard for dismissals is found in Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 773 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah App. 1989), which states: 
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"In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, this court must construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; and indulge all reasonable 
inferences in plaintifF s favor. (Citation omitted). Such a dismissal is appropriate only 
where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claims asserted. 
(Citation omitted)." (Emphasis added). 
See also: Giles' Brief at Pages 41-42. 
Issue 'B' of WCF's Brief was not properly preserved below and should be 
disregarded by this Court. WCF has not cited to any document filed by it before the 
Commission wherein it raised or addressed defenses to any of Giles' many allegations of 
unfairness, partiality, bias, prejudice, or conflicts of interest before the Commission. WCF 
has no right to raise new defenses to Giles' allegations before this Court. If this Court does 
consider Issue 'B', it should be reviewed under the aforementioned dismissal standard 
because Giles' request for an independent ALJ was summarily denied without a hearing. 
2) Reply to Argument of WCF 
WCF begins its argument by citing U.C.A. § 34A-1-301 (2001). WCF's Brief at 15. 
While this statute provides the Commission with the full power, jurisdiction, and authority 
to determine the facts and apply the law, the Commission has no authority to determine facts 
on summary judgment. R. Vol. 4 at 1033. 
Contrary to WCF's assertions, the 1991 statute and the current statute do not "contain 
the same substantive provisions". Footnote 4 of WCF's Brief at 12. § 35-2-110 (1991) ends 
with the following statement: " . . . no compensation under this chapter shall be payable." 
WCF's Brief at 2,15. Conversely, § 34A-3-111 (1997) ends with:"... compensation under 
this chapter may not be payable". The Legislature made a deliberate and substantive change 
to this statute in 1997, and also changed how the Commission was to apply it. The 
Legislature eliminated the mandatory bar to benefits, and enacted a statute to be applied with 
discretion. "Shall" is mandatory and "may" is discretionary. See: Anabasis. Inc. v. Labor 
Com'iL 30 P.3d 1236, 1243 (Utah App. 2001). 
Despite being apprized of this change by Giles, the Commission applied § 34A-3-111 
(1997) as an "absolute" bar to Giles' recovery. R. Vol. 4 at 1105-1106. The Legislature 
clearly intended a change, which the Commission has disregarded. The Commission granted 
WCF summary dismissal under a summary judgment standard which requires WCF to prove 
it "is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) 
56(c). Since the statute the Commission applied is discretionary, WCF cannot be entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law based on § 34A-3-111 (1997). Giles addressed the 
discretionary nature of this statute in her Request for Reconsideration, which was the first 
time it could have been raised by Giles. R. Vol. 4 at 1105-1106. Clearly, Giles could not 
address the application of the statute before the Commission applied it. 
Furthermore, WCF's Brief relies on a statute which the Commission determined did 
not apply. WCF has not argued that the Commission erred in applying the 1997 statute, but 
has merely addressed application of the 1991 statute. 
Moreover, both § 35-2-110 (1991) and § 34A-3-111 contain two requirements before 
compensation under the Occupational Disease Act can be disallowed. § 34A-3-111 requires: 
"The compensation provided under this chapter is not in addition to 
compensation that may be payable under Chapter 2 (Workers' Compensation Act), 
and in all cases when injury results by reason of an accident arising out of and in 
the course of employment and compensation is payable for the injury under Chapter 
2, compensation under this chapter may not be payable." (Emphasis added). 
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The Commission and WCF have only considered one prerequisite - the compensation Giles 
is receiving via the Settlement Agreement. But before the compensation can be considered 
there must be a determination that there is an injury, and the injury must result by reason of 
an accident arising out of and in the course of employment In her Brief, Giles addressed the 
fact that the findings of the Commission in the prior injury case have never been legally 
altered or changed. Giles' Brief at 26-35. WCF does not dispute this fact on appeal, but 
wants this Court to ignore the prior findings in favor of the Commission's new version of 
what occurred in the prior injury claim. 
In Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Com'n. 681 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1984), the 
Supreme Court held, citing Pacheco v. Industrial Commission. 668 P.2d 553 (1983): 
"Unlike an award, a settlement involves no factual determination by the 
Commission..." (Emphasis added.) 
Based on this ruling, the Commission's prior findings must stand as is. Therefore, Giles' 
occupational disease could not have resulted by an accident on 7 September 1991. 
WCF cites Wilburn v. Interstate Electric. 748 P.2d 582,587-588 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
for the proposition that a prior settlement could bar a subsequent claim, even though the 
subsequent claim was not specifically noted in the prior settlement. The present case is 
distinguishable from Wilburn for the following reasons. First, in Wilburn the claim was for 
additional benefits under the permanent total disability provisions of the Act for the same 
back injury previously settled by agreement. Second, the Commission determined the 
Settlement Agreement in Wilburn was ambiguous, and the Commission correctly held a 
hearing and accepted parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties. After the hearing 
the ALJ determined "as a matter of fact, that the agreement was validly executed by the 
parties as a settlement of a disputed claim, including for permanent total disability". 
Wilbunt at 586 in [3]. This Court had doubts as to whether the decision was "the fairest or 
the most appropriate". However, because the Commission made this determination as a 
matter of fact, after a hearing, the Court was obliged to give "maximum deference" to the 
facts determined by the Commission. Id 
Further, this Court held the following in Wilburn: 
"Section 35-1-90 provides, in relevant part: 
'No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation 
under this title shall be valid.' Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974). 
"Under this provision, setdements are appropriate only when the compensable 
nature of the worker's injury is disputed and the worker's right to recover is doubtful. 
See Brigham Young Univ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889 (1929). 
Conversely, when the compensability of a workers' compensation claim is not 
disputed, an employee cannot waive his claim by agreement. Barber Asphalt Corp. 
v. Industrial Comm % 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 (1943)." Wilburn at 586. 
This disease claim was not in dispute when the Settlement Agreement was executed 
on 8 March 1995, as asserted by WCF. The Commission had no jurisdiction over Giles' 
disease claim on 8 March 1995 because Giles did not file her notice of claim invoking the 
Commission's jurisdiction until 19 May 1995. Moreover, Giles is not asking for further 
benefits under the same injury claim which was settled. The Commission has treated Giles' 
disease claim as a separate claim from the beginning, and has refused to include the record 
from the injury claim in the present disease claim Record. The Settlement Agreement in the 
prior injury claim does not refer to any other exposures on any days other than 7 September 
1991. Neither does the Settlement Agreement address any type of occupational disease. The 
Settlement Agreement specifically states that it is subject to further Order of the 
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Commission, thereby precluding it from being "full and final". 
WCF tried to dispose of Giles' present disease claim based on the Settlement 
Agreement, but on advise from WCF's legal counsel, WCF acquiesced and accepted Giles' 
occupational disease claim as a separate claim. Giles' Brief at 19, R. Vol. 1 at 182. WCF 
had Oakridge file a Form 122 Employer's First Report of Illness wherein Oakridge admitted 
it did not know of Giles' occupational disease until 31 May 1995, almost three months after 
the Settlement Agreement was executed. Giles' Brief at 19, R. Vol. 1 at 182, Vol. 3 at 741, 
804-805, Vol. 4 at 958. Oakridge also admitted Giles' disease was incurred on Oakridge's 
premises. Oakridge later entered into the SA/Release with Giles, wherein Oakridge 
"acknowledged and agreed" that Giles had two separate claims before the Commission, and 
that Giles had not released her disease claim as of 17 August 1997. Giles' Brief at 21-22, 
R. Vol. 4 at 1081-1086. 
WCF further argues that the Settlement Agreement and Release (SA/Release) has no 
effect on the present disease claim based on Giles' late filing of the SA/Release, admissibility 
and jurisdictional issues, and basic principles of contract law. WCF failed to present any of 
these arguments to the Commission. When Giles filed her Request for Reconsideration, 
there were multiple responses from other parties, but WCF was conspicuously silent. Giles 
asserts that WCF's silence precludes it from raising any new arguments or defenses to the 
SA/Release for the first time on appeal. 
WCF states that "the Court of Appeals declines to review issues and evidence not 
properly presented at the . . . administrative, (sic) level." WCF's Brief at 14. But, Giles 
submitted her evidence with a timely and properly filed Request for Reconsideration, which 
is part of the Administrative Procedures Act, U.C. A. § 63-46b. Therefore, Giles did properly 
present her evidence at the administrative level. There has been no evidentiary hearing in 
this case. Giles was never allowed to present her case fully to the Commission. Moreover, 
WCF conducted no discovery in this case where Giles would have been required to divulge 
any evidence she might be presenting at a Hearing. 
Furthermore, Oakridge had full knowledge of the terms of the original Settlement 
Agreement and of the SA/Release. Workers' compensation is Giles' exclusive remedy 
against her employers for any injuries or diseases she may have incurred. See: U.C.A. § 35-
1-60. Giles' disease claim is against her employers, including Oakridge. The employers' 
insurers were joined solely to allow the insurer to represent and defend the employer. In 
Taslich v. Industrial CommissioiL 262 P. 281 at 286 (Utah 1927), the Supreme Court stated: 
"When application for compensation is made against the employer alone, his 
duties and obligations alone are involved, except as his carrier, if a legal entity and 
authorized so to do, may be permitted to appear and protect and defend them. But in 
doing so the carrier is restricted to the defenses and to the rights, duties, and 
obligations of the employer, and is not permitted to assert or maintain rights or 
defenses apart from those of the employer." (Emphasis added). 
Giles raised this quote at the same time she filed the SA/Release, and WCF has still not 
responded to it. R. Vol. 4 at 1043. The Taslich decision means none of Oakridge's insurers 
can assert defenses that Oakridge is not permitted to present. What's more, WCF has not 
shown that it was substantially prejudiced by Giles' late filing of the SA/Release. 
WCF argues the SA/Release may have been inadmissable. But, WCF did not raise 
any objection before the Commission challenging the admissibility of the SA/Release. The 
contemporaneous objection rule requires that an objection be made below before the 
15 
objection may be presented on appeal. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832 
(Utah 1984). So, this Court should disregard WCF's arguments concerning admissibility. 
WCF's jurisdictional arguments are similarly irrelevant. WCF represents that the SA/ 
Release has no effect on Giles' workers' compensation claims because the Federal and 
District Courts have no jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims. This argument 
assumes the Federal Court had a hand in the preparation or execution of the SA/Release. 
Besides the fact that this argument assumes facts not in evidence in the present case, the 
foregoing assumption is not accurate. The SA/Release was bargained for, prepared and 
executed without any input or approval from the Court. Oakridge's attorney and Giles' 
attorney hammered out the terms, Giles signed it, and then Oakridge's President signed it. 
The Court merely dismissed Giles' claim based on an agreed settlement between the parties. 
Moreover, there was no need for the Commission to approve any terms of the 
SA/Release for them to be binding on Giles' workers' compensation claims. The only 
agreements between an employer and employee that are specifically prohibited by statute are 
those which involve an employee waiving their right to compensation. See: §35-1-90. The 
SA/Release did not require Giles to waive any compensation. 
Giles agrees that basic principles of contract law apply to the SA/Release, just not as 
asserted by WCF. In the State of Utah: 
"The covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, 
(contracts)..." (Citations omitted). "Application of this covenant means that each 
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which 
will destroy or injure the other party' s right to receive the fruits of the contract." Little 
Caesar v. Bell Canvon Shopping Or.. 13 P.3d 600, 603 (Utah App. 2000). 
Oakridge breached not only the SA/Release but also the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, not once but multiple times. First, Oakridge allowed WCF and Wasatch Crest, as 
its agents, to present defenses that were contrary to the terms of the SA/Release. Now, 
Oakridge has allowed WCF to breach the contract again by making arguments attempting to 
escape the terms of the SA/Release before this Court. 
3) Reply to TAD's Issues and Determinative Law 
The only issue presented by TAD Technical Services Corp. and/or Liberty Mutual Ins. 
Co. (hereinafter collectively TAD) is one that is not appropriately determined on Summary 
Judgment. TAD admits the issue of medical causation is an "issue of fact". See: Standard 
of Review in TAD's Brief on Pages 1, 13-14, 15, and 17-23. See also: R. Vol. 4 at 1131, 
wherein TAD stated: "Medical causation involves a factual finding." Issues of fact are not 
to be determined on Summary Judgment. Indeed, as stated by the Commission: 
"Summary Judgment is never used to determine what the facts are, but only to 
determine if there are any issues of material fact in dispute. If there be any such 
disputed issues of fact, they cannot be resolved by summary judgment even when the 
parties properly bring the motion before the court." (R. Vol. 4 at 1033). 
See also: Hill v. Grand Central Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970). 
Giles addressed the inappropriateness of determining medical causation on Summary 
Judgment before the Commission on multiple occasions. See generally: R. Vol. 2 at 375-
380,490-495,499-501,Vol. 3. at 736-788 with Exhibits at Vol. 1 at 1-95, Vol. 3 at 884-918, 
Vol. 4 at 1037-1120, and 1149-1169. See specifically: R. Vol. 2 at 378-379,380,492-493, 
494-495, Vol. 3 at 763, 770, 775-776,784-786,787, 886, 887, 888-889, 898-900, 903-906, 
Vol. 4 at 1037,1099, and 1154-1155. 
Further, Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (URAP) states: 
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"(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the 
appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part 
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be 
set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule." (Emphasis 
added.) 
URAP Rule 24(a)(l 1) requires in pertinent part: 
"(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum 
shall contain a copy of: 
(1) Any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of 
central importance cited in the briefbut not reproduced verbatim 
in the brief; (Emphasis added.) 
Any determinative statute presented in a brief must be reproduced verbatim either in the 
brief or in an addendum. 
On Page 2 of its Brief, TAD cited U.C.A. "§ 35-2-14 (1990) . . . in relevant part*. 
TAD ends its quote with four periods representing that the quote is incomplete. Then, on 
Page 3 of its Brief, TAD cited U.C.A. § 35-2-27 (1990), and quoted it in pertinent part as 
follows: 
"For the purpose of this act, only the diseases enumerated in this section shall be 
deemed to be occupational diseases: 
(28) Such other diseases . . ." 
Obviously, there are at least 27 other numbered paragraphs TAD has not included in its 
quote. TAD did not reproduce verbatim in its Brief the statutes it asserts are determinative 
of this Appeal and failed to supply an addendum. TAD's failure is a violation of URAP Rule 
24. This Court should disregard TAD's arguments based on the above statutes. 
Nevertheless, the correct law to be applied in this case is the law as it existed when 
the cause of action arose in January 1995, U.C.A. Title 35-2, Utah Occupational Disease Act 
(1953), as last amended by the Legislature in 1994. TAD notes that Utah's appellate courts 
have not issued a definitive ruling on which law is to be apphed in the context of 
occupational disease cases. So, according to TAD, this is an "Issue of First Impression". 
4) Reply to TAD's Argument 
TAD did not raise below that Giles needed to submit evidence "with her Application 
for Hearing" of medical causation concerning TAD for her porphyria. If TAD had raised 
this below, Giles would have responded that the ALJ, Commission, and TAD have ignored 
the fact that Giles was not required to submit any medical evidence with her Application for 
Hearing. Commission Rule R602-2-1 -A in effect when Giles filed her Form 026 specifically 
states "applications shall include supporting medical documentation of the claim where there 
is a dispute over medical issues". None of the Appellees disputed Giles' occupational 
disease until after her application was filed, even though Giles had notified her prior 
employers and WCF almost six years previously of her claim for an occupational disease. 
Furthermore, while the ALJ and Commission repeatedly stated Giles bore the burden 
of proving her right to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence, Giles repeatedly disputed 
before the Commission that such burden applied to summary judgment or dismissal 
proceedings. R. Vol. 3 at 776, 784-786, 888-889, 903-906, Vol. 4 at 1041, 1154-1155. 
Even the Commission admitted in its Order Denying Motion for Review on Page 4: 
"The parties seeking summary dismissal of Mrs. Giles' claim have the burden of 
establishing their right to judgment, even when all facts and reasonable inferences are 
viewed in the light most favorable to (Giles). (Citations omitted). . . .[T]he Utah 
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Supreme Court observed: 
6
 Summary judgment is never used to determine what the facts are, but 
only to ascertain whether there are any material issues of fact in 
dispute. If there be any such disputed issues of fact, they cannot be 
resolved by summary judgment even when the parties properly bring 
the motion before the court/" R. Vol. 4 at 1033. 
Clearly the burden of proving the right to summary judgment was on TAD as the moving 
party. In order to prevail against a Motion for Summary Judgment, Giles is not required to 
prove her case. In Hobbs v. Labor Com'n 991 P.2d 590, 593 at Footnote 3 (Utah App. 
1999), this Court stated in the terms of this case: 
"(Giles') burden is not to persuade the court, but (Giles) must put forth evidence 
that 'raises a genuine issue of fact..." (Citation omitted). 
TAD had the burden to prove there were no material issues of fact in dispute. This 
Court stated in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah App. 
1988); in the terms applicable to this case: 
"In order for (Giles) to successfully oppose (TAD's) motion for summary 
judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for (her) to actually 
prove (her). . .theory. . . . It is only necessary for (Giles) to show 'facts' which 
controvert the 'facts' stated in (TAD's) affidavit. . . .(Giles) (must) (demonstrate) 
unresolved factual questions which make the grant of summary judgment to (TAD) 
improper." (Terms applicable to this case inserted). 
Giles fully explained how she had presented facts concerning her exposures at TAD and how 
those exposures could have contributed to her development of porphyria. R. Vol. 2 at 375-
380. Giles presented further information in her "Answers to Interrogatories" concerning 
exposures at TAD; identified witnesses she intended to call who would testify to the 
presence of chemicals, fumes, and other substances used in proximity to her workplace; and, 
identified multiple doctors and other health care providers who had records pertinent to this 
claim. See: Answers to Interrogatories at Addendum C of Giles' principal Brief, specifically 
Answers 2A, 3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 17, Full Answer 21, 23, 25, and Answers to Request for 
Production of Documents 1,2. Giles also submitted that many of the substances Dr. Baker 
attributed to causing Giles' porphyria at Oakridge were substances she was first exposed to 
at TAD. R. Vol. 2 at 398-403. In support of all of the foregoing; See: R. Vol. 2 at 490-496, 
R. Vol. 3 at 739, 761-776, 784-787, 887-890, 898-900, 903-907, R. Vol. 4 atl037-1038, 
1041-1043,1055-1058,1060-1063,1094,1096-1097,1098-L101, 1154-1161, 1162-1163. 
In an occupational disease case, an employee may have had multiple exposures to the 
hazards of the disease with multiple employers over the course of a career. Applying the law 
as it existed when the employee was exposed to the hazards of the disease with multiple 
employers would require the application of multiple laws, possibly even conflicting laws, to 
multiple employers. This is clear from the present case alone. 
In the present case, the last injurious exposure law in 1990, when Giles was employed 
by TAD, conflicts with the law in 1991 when Giles was employed by Oakridge. Under 
TAD's proposed solution, the Commission must apply one law to Oakridge and another law 
to TAD. Under the 1991 law, the Commission must apportion liability because Giles did not 
work for Oakridge for a full twelve months. But, under the 1990 law, no apportionment is 
allowed. Such conflicts could result in neither law being applied correctly. 
Giles asserts this issue is one that has been addressed by Utah's appellate courts, 
although maybe not specifically applied to occupational disease cases. In Stouffer Food 
Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n. 4 P.3d 1287 (Utah 2000), the Utah Supreme Court in Footnote 
2 held: "[i]n workers' compensation cases, we determine the rights and liabilities of the 
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parties as of the date when the accident at issue occurred". (Quoting from Moore v. 
American Coal Co.. 737 P.2d 989,990 (Utah 1987)). Pursuant to this ruling, the law to be 
applied is the law which governs "the rights and liabilities of the parties". In an occupational 
disease case, that law is the law in effect when the cause of action arises. 
For example, when Giles' occupational disease of porphyria was first diagnosed in 
January 1995, U.C.A. § 35-2-103(2) (1991) provided: 
"(2) Any employee who fails to notify his employer or the commission within 180 
days after the cause of action arises is barred from any claim of benefits arising from 
the occupational disease. The cause of action is considered to arise on the date the 
employee first suffered disability from the occupational disease andknew* or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the occupational disease 
was caused by employment? (Emphasis added.) 
This statute remains substantially unchanged to the present day, despite being renumbered 
and subdivided into two subsections. See U.C.A. § 34A-3-108(2)(a) and (b). While Giles 
became permanently and totally disabled in December 1991, Giles could not know that her 
disability was "from the occupational disease" of porphyria, or "that the occupational disease 
was caused by employment", until the occupational disease was first diagnosed in January 
1995. It is axiomatic, and this Court has previously ruled, that "(a) person cannot file an 
occupational disease claim for a disease that (s)he does not know (s)he has." See: Wrolstad 
v. Industrial Com'n of Utak 786 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah App. 1990). 
All other statutes of limitation provided elsewhere in the Occupational Disease Act 
stem from the date the cause of action arises. See U.C.A. § 35-2-108 (1991), now § 34A-3-
109. Likewise, benefits are to be computed based on the employee's average weekly wage 
at the time the cause of action arises. See U.C.A. §35-2-106 (1991), now codified in §34A-
3-107. The controlling date for all aspects of an occupational disease claim, including "the 
rights and liabilities of the parties " under the Act, is the date the cause of action arises, and 
the law to be applied is the law that existed at that time. Any other application ignores the 
plain language of the statutes in the Occupational Disease Act as a whole. Furthermore, 
applying the law as it existed when the cause of action arises is the only way to avoid 
applying multiple, and often conflicting, statutes to the same occupational disease claim. 
The 1991 statute went into effect on 29 April 1991, prior to Giles being hired by 
Oakridge, where she was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease in 1991. (See: 
Footnote 1 of Luckau v. Board of Review. 840 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 1992)). This statute 
requires apportionment in this case because Giles was not employed for at least 12 
consecutive months by Oakridge. Application of this law does not result in a retroactive 
application of the law to TAD, because this was the law in effect when Giles actually 
suffered her last injurious exposure at Oakridge, her last employer. TAD admits Giles' last 
injurious exposure occurred at Oakridge, where Giles was employed from June 1991 to 
December 1991. R. Vol. 2 at 341. This statute states which employer is liable if certain 
conditions are met. Those conditions were not met in this case, so apportionment is required. 
TAD did not file its Interrogatories as a part of the Record, and has quoted 
Interrogatory 21 and Giles' Answer to it out of context. Without the complete text of the 
Interrogatory, this Court can only guess at what information TAD requested Giles to furnish. 
5) Reply to PACIFIC'S Issue 
The sole issue presented by ACE-USA/Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. (hereinafter 
PACIFIC) is misleading. Actually, the issue is whether an insurer when the cause of action 
arises in an occupational disease claim can be held liable for benefits. Giles addressed this 
issue before the Commission at the following points in the Record: R. Vol. 2 at 375, 377, 
379,482-483,490-492,494,516-518,639,674-675,705,747,760,783-784,796-797,999-
1000, 1221-1223, 1049-1050. As argued before the Commission and not disputed by 
PACIFIC, the Commission has no jurisdiction over coverage disputes. R. Vol. 2 at 502,518, 
607, 639-640, Vol. 4 at 1049-1050,1222-1223. The Commission's jurisdiction is limited 
to conflicts between employers and employees, not insurers. Insurers are bound by statutes 
outside the Commission's jurisdiction to comply with the Commission's Orders respecting 
the liability of employers they insure. Coverage disputes fall within the jurisdiction of 
district court. Should this Court decide to consider this issue, the proper standard is the 
standard for dismissals because Giles' claim against PACIFIC was summarily dismissed. 
6) Reply to PACIFIC'S Argument 
Giles asserts PACIFIC has no right to move for dismissal because PACIFIC did not 
file a timely Answer in this case. In its Brie£ PACIFIC does not even pretend it did. 
Regardless, PACIFIC'S argument is that coverage only attaches during the employment 
period. While this may hold true for injury claims, this is an occupational disease claim. As 
already addressed in this Reply Brief on Pages 19, 22, and 23, occupational disease claims 
are based on when the cause of action arises. PACIFIC has admitted it was the carrier for 
TAD at the time the cause of action arose in this case in January 1995. Contrary to 
PACIFIC'S argument, the liability of a carrier when the cause of action arises is not clear 
from the statutes. Apparently, this is also an issue of first impression in Utah. The 
Commission's apportionment jurisdiction does not extend beyond employers. Therefore, the 
Commission had no jurisdiction to determine PACIFIC'S liability in this case. PACIFIC'S 
liability is between PACIFIC, TAD, and TAD's other insurers. The Commission is not the 
appropriate forum to resolve disputes between employers and their various insurers. Giles 
therefore asserts it was improper for the Commission to dismiss PACIFIC. Pursuant to 
Taslich, PACIFIC was only joined to this suit so it could appear, protect and defend TAD, 
anyway. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, dismissal of Giles' occupational disease claim was inappropriate 
because the Commission and the Appellees failed to follow proper procedure. The 
Commission violated its own statutes, its own rules, and abused its discretion in dismissing 
Giles' claim. In addition, none of the Appellees have established they are entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Giles hereby requests this Court to grant the relief previously 
requested by Giles in her principal Brief. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September 2004. 
,JJ8JU*AA. -ft), M^ 
Glenda W. Giles, Appellant Pro Se 
NOTE: This Reply Brief was prepared with an enormous amount of assistance from 
my son, Robert E. Giles. 
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OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and/or WORKERS ) Case No. 20010565-CA 
COMPENSATION FUND; WASATCH CREST ) 
MUTUAL INSURANCE; EMPLOYERS' REIN- ) 
SURANCE FUND; IRS; ADECCO, tfk/a TAD ) 
TECHNICAL SERVICES CORPORATION, and/or ) Oral Argument 
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TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY; ) 
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS' INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
and UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, ) 
Respondents/Appellees. ) 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider a Petition for Rehearing pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 35 and Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(l). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply the Utah Supreme Court opinion in 
Barker v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 970 P.2d 702 (Utah 1998) regarding final agency action? 
In reviewing whether the law has been misapplied or interpreted erroneously under 63-
46b-16(4)(d), the standard of review is correction of error, Savage Indus.. Inc. v. Utah 
1 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
2. In its Memorandum decision, this Court did not address Giles' argument that 
jurisdiction is properly accepted where there would not be an adequate remedy after an 
award has been issued. Because this issue can be applied whether or not final agency 
action has occurred, should this Court revisit this issue? See Burton v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Arizona, 801 P.2d 473 (Ariz. App. 1990). In reviewing a case where all 
issues have not been decided under 63-46b-16(4)(c), the standard of review is correction 
of error, Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 726 P.2d 427. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Appellant submits the following statutes may be determinative of the central issues 
in this proceedings: 
Section 63-46b-16(l), U.C.A. (1997): 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
Section 63-46b-13(l)(a), U.C.A. (1997): 
(l)(a) Within twenty days after the date that an order is issued for which 
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is 
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, 
any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the agency, 
stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the Case 
This case involves a total denial by the Utah Labor Commission of Petitioner 
Glenda Giles9 request for the appointment of an administrative law judge who is not 
2 
employed by the Commission to hear her occupational disease case. 
(b) Course of Proceedings1 
1. Together with her Application for Hearing to the Commission, Giles attached a 
letter dated 20 December 2000 in which she formally requested her case be assigned to an 
ALJ with absolutely no ties to the Commission (see Addendum). In a letter dated 22 
February 2001 addressed to Giles, Presiding Administrative Law Judge Richard M. La 
Jeunesse stated: "The Labor Commission is the only agency that has jurisdiction to hear 
workers' compensation cases. Therefore, it is not possible to even entertain your request 
that a judge outside the Labor Commission hear your case." (see Addendum). 
2. In a letter dated 8 March 2001, Giles requested the Commission review PLJ La 
Jeunesse's Order. On 30 April 2001, the Commission issued an Order denying Giles' 
Motion for Review, and exercised jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 
(see Addendum). 
3. In a letter dated 17 May 2001, Giles requested reconsideration of the Commis-
sion's Order Denying Motion for Review. On 21 May 2001, the Commission issued an 
Order Extending Time for Reconsideration, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9), and 
invoked jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13. The Commission exten-
ded time to issue its decision a total of two days; and, also granted two select parties the 
1
 Giles' does not have benefit of access to the record for appropriate citations and 
does not wish to overburden the Court with repetitive duplicate copies of Motions and 
letters. She is only including documents she considers essential in the Addendum. 
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preferential right to respond to the Request for Reconsideration (see Addendum). On 25 
May 2001, Floyd W. Holm on behalf of Oakridge Country Club and Workers Compensa-
tion Fund filed a Response to the Request for Reconsideration (see Addendum). 
4. In a letter dated 29 May 2001, Giles filed an Objection to the Order Extending 
Time for Reconsideration; and, a Motion to Strike any responses filed. In a letter dated 
1 June 2001, Giles filed a Response to Holm's Response to the Request for Reconsid-
eration. On 11 June 2001, the Commission issued an Order Denying Reconsideration 
(see Addendum). 
5. In a letter dated 1 July 2001 addressed to PLJ La Jeunesse, Giles notified the 
Commission of her intent to pursue judicial review of the Order Denying Reconsidera-
tion, and requested a stay of that Order and any further action in Giles' case pending 
judicial review. To date, the Commission has failed to even acknowledge that request, 
(see Addendum). On 11 July 2001, Giles filed a Petition for Review with this Court; and 
on 6 December 2001, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision dismissing Giles' 
Petition for Review. That Memorandum Decision forms the basis for this Petition for 
Rehearing (see Addendum). 
(c) Disposition at Agency 
PLJ La Jeunesse denied Giles9 request for an ALJ with absolutely no ties to the 




The facts relevant to this Petition for Rehearing are few. 
1. The Labor Commission exercised jurisdiction to review PLJ La Jeunesse's 
Order under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12. 
2. The Labor Commission exercised jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
13 in its Order Extending Time for Reconsideration, in addition to authority under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9). 
3. The Labor Commission exercised jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-13 in its Order Denying Reconsideration. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. In its Memorandum Decision, the Court of Appeals misapplied the Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling in Barker. This misapplication was the result of the Supreme 
Court's paraphrased definitions, and not the fault of this Court. The complete definition 
requires a deference to the intent of the agency regarding final agency action, which this 
Court could not divine from the Supreme Court's paraphrased definition. Being unaware 
of that fact, this Court imposed its own conclusions over those of the Commission on the 
finality of the Commission's Orders, giving no deference to the Commission's intentions. 
This Court assumed it was to consider whether the agency action was preliminary, prepa-
ratory, procedural, or intermediate, and therefore found final agency action did not occur. 
Accordingly, this Court did not apply any other portions of Barker. This Court should 
apply all applicable rulings in Barker to the present case. Doing so would confirm final 
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agency action did occur. 
2. The Court of Appeals did not address Giles' argument that jurisdiction is 
properly accepted where there would not be an adequate remedy after an award has been 
issued. This argument applies whether or not final agency action has occurred, and 
should therefore have been addressed in this Court's Memorandum Decision. Clearly, 
there would be no adequate remedy for Giles to receive a fair and impartial hearing be-
fore an ALJ free of bias, prejudice, and conflicts of interest after she has had a hearing 
before a Commission ALJ. A hearing before an ALJ with the preceding qualifications is 
a fundamental and constitutional right which the Commission has ruled Giles is entitled 
to receive, and it is also an integral component of due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PROPER APPLICATION OF BARKER V. UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE 
COM'N. WOULD REQUIRE A FINDING THAT THE ORDER DENYING 
RECONSIDERATION CONSTITUTED FINAL AGENCY ACTION. 
In Barker, on Page 705 under the heading "II. Jurisdiction", in Paragraph 3, the 
Utah Supreme Court made the following observation: 
"The Utah Administrative Procedures Act does not specifically define 
'final agency action.9 However, it does say that an agency will contemplate 
reconsideration of an order only ' if the order would otherwise constitute 
final agency action'. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13. We can thus assume 
the Commission considered the ... order to be a final agency action by 
virtue of its failure to indicate that the action was not final at the time of the 
rehearing request. The Commission merely denied the request for rehearing 
by nonaction instead of notifying petitioners that they would have to apply 
for rehearing at a later date." 
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In the present case, Giles not only petitioned the Commission for reconsideration, 
but the Commission exercised jurisdiction under § 63-46b-13 in its Order Extending 
Time for Reconsideration, and in its Order Denying Reconsideration. If the Supreme 
Court in Barker assumes an order to be final agency action by virtue of the Commission's 
failure to indicate the action was not final at the time of the rehearing request, then when 
the Commission exercises jurisdiction on reconsideration and issues two orders so declar-
ing, there can be no doubt the Commission intended the Order Denying Motion for Re-
view to otherwise constitute final agency action, and the Order Denying Reconsideration 
was final agency action on this issue. 
Furthermore, the two select parties afforded a preferential opportunity to respond 
to Giles' Request for Reconsideration were told, in the Order Extending Time, the Com-
mission was exercising jurisdiction under § 63-46b-13. Neither of these select parties 
objected to the reconsideration on the grounds the Order Denying Motion for Review 
would not otherwise constitute final agency action. Therefore, it is clear the Commission 
and the primary parties viewed the Order Denying Motion for Review as otherwise 
constituting final agency action, and considered the Order Denying Reconsideration final 
agency action until Giles filed her Petition for Review with this Court. In Barker, the 
Commission argued that its Order did not represent final agency action. In the present 
case, the Commission has made no such argument. If the Supreme Court can find in 
Barker that the Commission's Order was final agency action despite the Commission's 
argument it was not, then Giles' argument carries even more weight because in the 
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present case the Commission has made no such argument that its Orders did not consti-
tute final agency action. 
In the Addendum, Giles has attached two recent Labor Commission decisions 
which clearly exemplify the Commission's understanding of reviewable decisions. In a 
Decision dated 19 April 2001, in the case entitled J.L.C. v. Emery Mining Corp., Mr. C. 
asked the Commission to review an ALJ's Interim Order Denying Motion to Dismiss. 
The Commission dismissed the motion for review without prejudice, allowing the parties 
to file motions for review including all issues, including any issues raised in the current 
motion for review, if such issues were not resolved by the ALPs final order. 
In a Decision dated 27 August 2001, in the case entitled D.L.B., widow of G.E.B., 
v. W. R. White Co.. the Commission noted no evidentiary hearing had been conducted in 
the matter. For that reason, the Commission viewed any agency review proceeding as 
premature, and remanded the matter to an ALJ for further proceedings. Clearly, the 
Commission distinguished Giles' case as being worthy of administrative review and 
reconsideration, and intended its Orders to constitute final agency action. Obviously the 
Commission understands when a matter is brought before it prematurely, but clearly it 
did not believe Giles' Motions were premature. As in Barker, no one questioned the 
finality of the Commission's Orders until this appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals. 
The Utah Supreme Court next stated in Barker at [2]: 
"Because of the nature of agency proceedings, final actions often take 
place seriatim, disposing completely of discrete issues in one order while 
leaving other issues for later orders. Such orders will be final as to any 
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issue fully decided by that order and appealable any time from the date of 
that order to the last day to appeal the last final agency action in the case." 
In the present case, the Commission has fully decided the discrete issue of whether 
to appoint an independent ALJ to preside over Giles' occupational disease claim. The 
Commission has completed its decision-making process on this discrete issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Barker at [3], then quoted this U.S. Supreme Court 
statement regarding the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1988): 
"(T)he relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the 
process of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial 
review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether 
rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow 
from the agency action." 
In the present case, the administrative decision-making process is complete on the 
issue being appealed to this Court. Judicial review of this issue will not disrupt the order-
ly process of adjudication because the adjudicative hearing on the occupational disease 
claim has yet to begin. Clearly, the Commission determined in its Order Denying Motion 
for Review that Giles has a right to a fair and impartial hearing before an ALJ free of 
bias, prejudice, and conflicts of interest; but, the Commission concluded Giles' evidence 
of bias, prejudice, and conflicts of interest was not convincing.2 The legal consequence 
that flows from the agency action is Giles must have her occupational disease claim 
2
 "The burden of proof in workmens' compensation cases is by a preponderance 
of the evidence." Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979). Clearly, the 
Commission engaged in an unlawful decision-making process by expecting Giles' Motion 
for Reconsideration to 'convince' the Commission. 
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adjudicated by a Commission ALJ, which Giles asserts deprives her of the very right the 
Commission determined Giles is entitled to have. 
After the preceding quote, the Utah Supreme Court in Barker cited two U.S. 
Supreme Court cases, Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget 
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71, 91 S.Ct. 203, 209, 27 L.Ed.2d 203 (1970) and Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 2773-74, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992). In 
Franklin, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
"An agency action is not final, for purposes of judicial review under 5 
U.S.C.S. § 704, if such action is only tentative or the ruling of a subordinate 
official; in determining finality, the core question is whether (1) the agency 
has completed its decision-making process, and (2) the result of such 
process will directly affect the parties." 
In the present case, the action complained of is not tentative nor is it merely the 
ruling of a subordinate official. The Commission issued tliree Orders signed by the Labor 
Commissioner himself. The Commission was given every opportunity provided for under 
administrative review, and it completed its decision-making process on this issue. Its 
decision does directly affect the parties, and does therefore qualify as final agency action. 
Only at this point in Barker did the Utah Supreme Court make this statement: 
"Similarly, the Model State Administrative Procedure Act defines final 
agency action negatively as 'the whole or a part' of any action which is not 
'preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to 
subsequent agency action of that agency or another agency.' 1981 Model 
State Admin. P. Act 5-102(b)(2)." 
The Supreme Court did not, as this Court suggested, distinguish orders that were 
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate, but credited the 1981 Model State 
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Administrative Procedure Act with these negative definitions. Unfortunately, these defi-
nitions were paraphrased by the Supreme Court, which changed the entire meaning of the 
definitions. This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, because the Supreme Court was 
attempting to define final agency action more explicitly, and apparently created additional 
confusion instead. Secondly, the whole purpose of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, who prepared the 1981 Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, is to attempt to bring uniformity to state administrative procedures throughout 
the nation. Unless the complete definitions are applied, there can be no uniformity. In 
reality, the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act in § 5-102(b)(see Addendum) 
defines final and non-final agency action as follows: 
"(b) For purposes of this section and Section 5-103: 
(1) "Final agency action" means the whole or a part of any agency 
action other than non-final agency action; 
(2) "Non-final agency action" means the whole or a part of an 
agency determination, investigation, proceeding, hearing, conference, or 
other process that the agency intends or is reasonably believed to intend 
to be preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to 
subsequent agency action of that agency or another agency." (Emphasis 
added.) 
This Court only applied the paraphrased negative definitions of final agency action 
in Barker to the present case. The above more explicit definitions clearly require an 
assessment of the agency's intent when determining finality. All indications in the 
present case are that the Commission intended their Orders to be final agency action. 
Contrast this with the circumstances in Barker, and the present case provides an even 
stronger argument that final agency action did occur. The Commission, by considering 
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Giles' Motions for Review and for Reconsideration, intended its Orders on review and 
reconsideration to be final agency action on the issue of appointment of an independent 
ALJ. Furthermore, if the Commission viewed its orders as non-final agency action, it 
should have been the first to file a Motion to Dismiss Giles' appeal with this Court based 
on the lack of final agency action. To date, the Commission has made no such Motion, 
and this non-action is further evidence it intended the Order Denying Reconsideration to 
be final agency action. When the Commission's intentions are considered under the full 
definitions of the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, a finding that final 
agency action did occur is clearly required. In its Memorandum Decision, this Court 
clearly considered its own conclusions instead of the intent of the Commission when it 
decided the Commission's action was "preliminary, preparatory, and procedural", and 
therefore not final. 
In Barker, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "Thus quite clearly, at the time of 
appeal, all parties understood the order... to constitute an appealable final agency action. 
We see no reason to regard it differently." Since, in the present case, the Commission 
and the primary parties considered the Commission's Orders final until the appeal was 
filed with this Court, Giles can see no reason for this Court to regard it differently. 
POINT II 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION NEED NOT OCCUR FOR THIS COURT 
TO ACCEPT JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE IF POSTPONEMENT 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW WOULD RESULT IN AN INADEQUATE 
REMEDY OR IRREPARABLE HARM DISPROPORTIONATE TO 
THE PUBLIC BENEFIT DERIVED FROM POSTPONEMENT. 
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Giles argued in her Response to Holm's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Review 
that jurisdiction is properly accepted when there would not be an adequate remedy after 
an award has been issued. Giles cited Burton wherein the Arizona Court of Appeals held: 
"Court of Appeals properly accepted jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal 
from administrative law judge's order prohibiting him from having tape 
recorder with him during medical examination, which was entered prior to 
Industrial Commission's award, since petitioner would not have an 
adequate remedy after an award had been issued." 
Additionally, the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act states in § 5-103 
under the heading "Non-final Agency Action Reviewable": 
"A person is entitled to judicial review of non-final agency action only if: 
(1) it appears likely that the person will qualify under Section 5-102 for 
judicial review of the related final agency action, and 
(2) postponement of judicial review would result in an inadequate 
remedy or irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived 
from postponement." 
Giles pointed out in her Response to Holm's Motion to Dismiss Petition for 
Review that a fair and impartial hearing before an ALJ free of bias, prejudice, and/or 
conflicts of interest is infinitely more important than allowing a tape recorder during a 
medical review. Giles further argues that raising this issue after a hearing has been con-
ducted by a Commission ALJ would cause irreparable harm, and does not provide an 
adequate remedy. After a Commission ALJ has conducted a hearing, all other parties will 
object to Giles' request for the appointment of an independent ALJ oh the grounds of res 
judicata Clearly, the only hope Giles has of obtaining her right to a fair and impartial 
hearing before an ALJ free of bias, prejudice, and/or conflicts of interest, given the facts 
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revealed by her evidence filed with the Commission, is to have an independent ALJ 
appointed before a hearing is held on her occupational disease claim. See State Tax 
Com'n v. Iverson. 782 P.2d 519 at [2, 3], (Utah 1989). As previously stated by Giles and 
the Commis-sion, her right to a fair and impartial hearing before an ALJ free of bias, 
prejudice and conflicts of interest is provided for constitutionally, statutorily, and by 
Commission practice. This basic fundamental right is also m integral part of due process, 
and cannot be dismissed lightly. See Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 696 P.2d 
1219, 1220 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
The actions of the Commission do qualify as final agency action under Barker, and 
accordingly this Court should accept jurisdiction. Even in the unlikely event this Court 
determines final agency action has not occurred, this Court should still accept jurisdiction 
because Giles has no adequate remedy before the Commission, and the harm to Giles 
would be irreparable and disproportionate to the public benefit derived from postpone-
ment of judicial review. 
I hereby certify that this Petition for Review is presented in good faith, and not for 
delay. Respectfully submitted this 20th day of December, 2001. 
Glenda W. Giles 
Petitioner Pro Se 
NOTE: This document was prepared with assistance from my son. 
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